تحت عنوان “حرب في لبنان لتفاديها” ، كتب ديفيد هيل في موقع ” this is beirouth” في اطار مقالات شهرية يتناول فيها ملفات تتصل بلبنان والمنطقة:
The Lebanese Republic’s founding National Pact called for neutrality. It was a wise principle that would have spared Lebanon much tragedy. Sadly, it was rarely honored. But it remains relevant. As yet another Israeli-Palestinian tragedy unfolds, in this case driven by Iranian logic, I’d urge my Lebanese friends to re-examine the intrinsic value of neutrality, or at least abstinence.
We all know Hezbollah runs the show in Lebanon. In case anyone had forgotten, Nasrallah’s brazen speech on November 3, 2023 was a reminder. Unlike in the past, he is no longer even pretending there is a state of Lebanon, or a government, or any other master except the Iranian revolutionary regime. He declared Hezbollah would join the war against Israel; he said it was just a matter of time. Would the Lebanese be consulted about life and death decisions he and Tehran were making on their behalf? Of course not. Nor is this the cautious, calculating Nasrallah of the past, because he is no longer in charge of even Hezbollah’s tactical decisions. Tehran is.
None of this is to suggest that millions of Lebanese aren’t saddened, moved, angered, frustrated, and more about the fate of innocent Palestinians and Israelis or the failure to achieve peace between them. They are. But Lebanon, after the Palestinians, has been a prominent Arab victim of this now generations-long conflict, without ever being a protagonist. For reasons related to their own divisions, Lebanese leaders stood apart from serial Israeli-Arab conflicts in 1948-9, 1956, 1967, and 1973. Unfortunately, it became the cockpit for conflict afterward, because it suited the interests of the Palestinians, Syrians, and revolutionary Iranians. Israel’s invasion and occupation of Lebanon gave justification and fuel to that enterprise, but after the 2000 withdrawal the resistance has only had the anomalous status of the 22 square kilometer Shebaa Farms to justify its perpetuation. This situation serves Iran’s interests, and Hezbollah’s, but certainly no obvious Lebanese national interest, let alone a Palestinian one. Hezbollah may use the situation in Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza to recruit and motivate young fighters, but it is hard to see how Hezbollah’s militancy is actually helping the Palestinians fulfill their self-determination, let alone help Lebanon preserve its integrity in stressful times.
And no Lebanese needs a reminder from Washington of the stress under which they live. Hezbollah’s violation of Lebanese neutrality and spurning of the policy of dissociation from the Syrian conflict comprised the opening phase of the current descent to Hell. Its defense of the Asad regime brought 1.5 million Syrian refugees and, separately, more than a few Daesh terrorists into Lebanon. It fueled instability inside and all around Lebanon. Corrupt Lebanese elites compounded the situation with a financial and economic crisis of unprecedented dimensions, and a paralytic governance crisis over the presidency twice in six years. The Lebanese state was never strong and has suffered a long decline caused by many hands. Yet few have reaped more benefits from this erosion than Hezbollah.
So, why in Heaven’s name, double down by joining Iran’s war with Israel? What more certain way to destroy what is left of Lebanon — of its economy, tolerance, civility, and sovereignty? Even Nasrallah himself seemed uneasy with the course he laid out on November 3. It is as if he, too, was one more lamb being led to slaughter by forces larger than himself or Hezbollah. Do Lebanese in the South, his loyal base, have confidence in Nasrallah’s course? Their flight northward suggests otherwise.
What is the alternative? We know the limitations of Lebanon’s governance structure today. We know Lebanon is hanging by a thread. We know the socio-economic situation has led to a level of degradation unequal to the dignity and capacity of the individual Lebanese. And we know salvation does not rest in the hands of the Lebanese, sadly. But don’t make it worse by allowing Tehran to drive Lebanon into a senseless war ignited by its other favored proxy, Hamas. The Palestinians deserve justice, self-governance and better leadership. There is little Lebanon can contribute to that cause through war.
What can America do? Stop enabling Iran. Stop trying to buy a temporary truce through arms-for-money deals and the de facto suspension of oil sanctions. Stop pretending there is a nuclear deal to be gained by ignoring the behavior of Iran in the five Arab capitals it dominates, Baghdad, Sanaa, Damascus, and Beirut — and Gaza City until this month. Stop ignoring the reality that the Middle East is one campaign theater, or that the central regional competition is between the U.S. and Iran. Stop allowing Iran to drive the agenda. The U.S. and its partners are on the defensive, Iran and its allies on the offensive. For those who do not want to live in a world dominated by Tehran, it is imperative for the U.S. and its partners to turn the tables.
Diplomatic success requires both applying pressure and offering opportunities. The violence between Hamas and Israel will pause, although it will take weeks, at least. What do we do then? Go back to a Middle East that produces these tragedies with some regularity, each time worse? Back to the same old policies that produce the same old intolerable outcomes? Let’s hope not.
A multifaceted, multilayered policy by America and its partners is needed. Washington should apply maximum pressure on Iran and its proxies, far more even than we saw in the Trump administration. That approach may entail some real pain in places like Lebanon where fence-sitters who aren’t advocates of Hezbollah nonetheless see a practical advantage in cooperating with it. The U.S. should also resume the thankless but inescapable effort to open pathways to meet Palestinian aspirations. But alongside, America’s partners could be more assertive. Even President Biden acknowledged that the emerging normalization deal involving Saudi Arabia, Israel, and U.S. security guarantees may have prompted Hamas’ attack. If so, it is confirmation that an assertive Saudi diplomatic presence in the Levant is a needed balance against Iranian militancy, rather than accommodation. But it will entail risks, and the U.S. should develop strategies to enable our partners to handle those risks. While helping our friends in the Gulf, we must pay more attention to the needs of our beleaguered friends in the Levant as they take risks to defy Iran and its proxies. Meanwhile, this is a war to avoid.
